The argument here seems to assume that (1) Russia wasn’t prepared for an energy export ban in early 2022 and (2) if an export ban had been imposed it would have ended the SOM immediately.
Luis - you also seem incredibly optimistic that Europe could have weathered any resulting energy price hikes. But gas was already at 10x american prices even without the export ban.
When European countries decided to supplement the financial restrictions already imposed on Russia with trade measures, the decision to act on imports/exports could have been simplified (passing the ballot to Mr. Lerner) to acting on imports or exports (one of the two). However, given the choice between one or the other, I believe that cutting certain EU technological exports—critical to the war effort—(imports from Russia) would have been more effective and efficient than cutting EU imports of Russian oil (exports from Russia), since oil is a basic energy commodity in demand on the world market (Russia could find many other customers, even if it had to settle for a lower price than that charged to the EU), while strategic EU technological exports to Russia would be much more difficult for Russia to acquire in markets other than the EU in this time of war.
Thanks Antonio for your comment. A couple of remarks:
1) Yes, we did ostensibly cut our exports (their imports) of tech. The reality however (see the Robin Brooks link in the post) is that this has been circunvented by the exporting countries ourselves- by going through the ex-USSR Asian republics, mainly. Russia has not been hampered in accessing advanced technology.
2) As for their oil and gas exports, not so easy as it seems, particularly in that critical MArch- May window when they were in a financial crisis.. Gas, in particular, is hard to replace as it comes through pipelines. A lot of the oil comes as well through pipes. The oil fleet was European (mostly Greek) and the insurnaces as well.
It’s a bit hard to care about this stuff when Europe in general and the nazis in Berlin specifically are arming and aiding the Holocaust in Gaza. Not even a whisper of sanctions on Israel after two years of genocide.
There is of course the other argument - why is defending Ukraine from Russia in the interests of 🇪🇺 citizens? Putting aside the russophobic nonsense from the 3 baltic minnows and the Poles, the argument feels a bit thin.
What has likely happened as a result of this war is that Ukraine will not be part of 🇪🇺 for the forseeable future (too expensive for 🇪🇺 to rebuild) and that Europe will face more waves of ukrainian refugees but this time men with weapons and military experience. How can this end well?
The argument here seems to assume that (1) Russia wasn’t prepared for an energy export ban in early 2022 and (2) if an export ban had been imposed it would have ended the SOM immediately.
Luis - you also seem incredibly optimistic that Europe could have weathered any resulting energy price hikes. But gas was already at 10x american prices even without the export ban.
When European countries decided to supplement the financial restrictions already imposed on Russia with trade measures, the decision to act on imports/exports could have been simplified (passing the ballot to Mr. Lerner) to acting on imports or exports (one of the two). However, given the choice between one or the other, I believe that cutting certain EU technological exports—critical to the war effort—(imports from Russia) would have been more effective and efficient than cutting EU imports of Russian oil (exports from Russia), since oil is a basic energy commodity in demand on the world market (Russia could find many other customers, even if it had to settle for a lower price than that charged to the EU), while strategic EU technological exports to Russia would be much more difficult for Russia to acquire in markets other than the EU in this time of war.
Thanks Antonio for your comment. A couple of remarks:
1) Yes, we did ostensibly cut our exports (their imports) of tech. The reality however (see the Robin Brooks link in the post) is that this has been circunvented by the exporting countries ourselves- by going through the ex-USSR Asian republics, mainly. Russia has not been hampered in accessing advanced technology.
2) As for their oil and gas exports, not so easy as it seems, particularly in that critical MArch- May window when they were in a financial crisis.. Gas, in particular, is hard to replace as it comes through pipelines. A lot of the oil comes as well through pipes. The oil fleet was European (mostly Greek) and the insurnaces as well.
No way China would have let Russia collapse.
For the 80 years of the War of Independence of Holland, the Spanish troops were regularly feed by grain exports from the Holland province…
Not a consolation, but this shows how difficult is economic warfare.
It’s a bit hard to care about this stuff when Europe in general and the nazis in Berlin specifically are arming and aiding the Holocaust in Gaza. Not even a whisper of sanctions on Israel after two years of genocide.
There is of course the other argument - why is defending Ukraine from Russia in the interests of 🇪🇺 citizens? Putting aside the russophobic nonsense from the 3 baltic minnows and the Poles, the argument feels a bit thin.
What has likely happened as a result of this war is that Ukraine will not be part of 🇪🇺 for the forseeable future (too expensive for 🇪🇺 to rebuild) and that Europe will face more waves of ukrainian refugees but this time men with weapons and military experience. How can this end well?
And now we have russian bots even here
😴