Designed for Weakness

The European Commission’s leadership problem

“The EU’s fiscal rules require a budget deficit under 3 percent of GDP. The Commission in 2015 gave France two more years to bring its deficit below that level but it failed to do so. Asked why the Commission had turned a blind eye to French infractions, Juncker told French TV that it did so “because it is France.” Politico, 23 Feb 2018.

Amid existential crises for the European Union, a curious fact stands out: the recently reelected President of the European Commission is Ursula von der Leyen, a politician whose record as Germany’s Defense Minister was widely considered calamitous.

During von der Leyen’s tenure at the German Defense Ministry (2013-2019), the Bundeswehr descended into a state of complete unreadiness. The German army’s ambition shrank to the goal of having a single operational brigade, which would take at least a month to deploy outside its borders. German soldiers used broomsticks painted black to simulate machine guns during a NATO “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” due to equipment shortages. Fewer than 30% of German fighter jets, helicopters, and tanks were operational. When she left office, not a single German submarine was seaworthy.

The architect of this disaster now leads its rearmament efforts. Nor is von der Leyen’s case exceptional. Since the turn of the century, the European Commission has been led by a string of weak leaders like José Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker, and now von der Leyen. Barroso left Portugal’s economy and finances in disarray before ascending to Brussels after 2 years as Prime Minister. Juncker, not coincidentally the third president from the tiny state of Luxembourg, openly admitted that the Commission enforced rules selectively based on political expediency rather than treaty obligation.

Leaders set agendas, make difficult decisions, direct funds, and inspire confidence—or fail to. The EU’s habit of picking weak leaders has severe consequences.

The process favors compromise

The selection of unremarkable, malleable figures to lead the Commission is not accidental; it is a feature of the EU’s structure. National leaders in the European Council propose a candidate, who must then be approved by the European Parliament. The process favors politicians who provoke the fewest objections. Put simply, the EU doesn’t select its best leaders, but the least objectionable ones.

National leaders want a Commission that executes policy without challenging their authority. A strong Commission President could become a rival power center, overshadowing them and holding them accountable as the “guardian of the Treaties.” By selecting leaders with little political capital, modest ambition, or checkered records, national governments ensure the Commission remains subordinate. This is why accomplished national leaders rarely become Commission Presidents.

The 2019 selection of von der Leyen was a clear example. The qualities that made her a poor defense minister—a focus on rhetoric over results and an inability to challenge vested interests—were precisely what made her an acceptable Commission President.

After the European elections, the frontrunner was the EPP’s lead candidate, Manfred Weber. However, French President Emmanuel Macron vetoed him. The main rival, Frans Timmermans, was then blocked by the (Eastern) Visegrád Group countries over his role in rule-of-law disputes. After a three-day negotiating marathon, von der Leyen emerged not because of her qualifications, but because she was the path of least resistance. When she left the German Defense Ministry, her reputation was so damaged that her political future in Germany appeared bleak. For Chancellor Angela Merkel, promoting her to Brussels was a convenient solution: it removed a weakened ally from domestic politics and installed a pliant German representative in the Commission.

One democratic filter could have stopped these games: the European Parliament, of which I was then a member. Parliament had long pushed for the Spitzenkandidat process, where the leader of a winning parliamentary list becomes President. Despite our misgivings, we confirmed von der Leyen. Her narrow victory—by only nine votes—underscored her status as a compromise, not an inspiring choice.

Why did I, as an MEP, vote to confirm her? Answering this question reveals why changing Europe is so hard. The EU is governed by a grand coalition of the center-right, liberals, and socialists. Instead of an ideological contest, Parliament’s main goal is to preserve this pro-European center, to preserve what Commissioner Josep Borrell memorably called “our own tidy garden” from the encroaching jungle. As a liberal MEP, I saw our main task as forming a firewall against rising anti-integrationist and populist parties. I believed rejecting the Council nominee would have triggered an institutional crisis, handing a victory to forces seeking to paralyze the Union. Our vote, my vote, was a defensive choice to prevent chaos—to hold the center, even if it meant accepting a leader chosen for her weakness.

But this need to hold the center and pass legislation through broad deals and coalition politics, which I always appreciated while in Brussels, neuters the political debate and the potential to demand accountability. The basic political struggle in Brussels is between the parties governing essentially everywhere in Europe against the extreme right and the extreme left. Any deviation is a betrayal.

Von der Leyen’s first term revealed her limits. Despite talk of a “geopolitical Commission,” her administration’s response to major challenges was consistently weak. On its core duty of ensuring countries fulfill treaty obligations, the Commission has been more obedient civil servant than “guardian of the treaties.” On the single market, infringement actions fell by 21% over four years while trade barriers grew. France’s current fiscal crisis would be unthinkable if the Commission had enforced the fiscal rules, as President Juncker memorably acknowledged (see the opening quote of this post). When spending recovery funds, von der Leyen refused to police the legal conditions for disbursement. She failed to rein in Italy’s “superbonus” debacle or stop payments to Spain when it broke its commitments by passing a pension reform that deepened its structural deficit.

For the EU to get stronger leaders, the incentives must change. As long as national governments view a strong Commission President as a threat, they will advance weak compromise candidates.

Several reforms could alter this dynamic. A direct election of the President would create a leader with a continent-wide mandate. Fully respecting the Spitzenkandidat process would also grant democratic legitimacy.

Historically, member states have ceded power to Brussels only under duress. Today’s risk is that crises could spiral and undermine the Union itself. Von der Leyen’s reappointment shows the durability of this system. Despite her record, she was a known quantity that member states felt they could manage—exactly what the process is designed to find.

Weak Commission leadership isn’t a bug in the European system; it’s a feature. Until Europeans demand a stronger Union with accountable leadership, they will be governed by leaders chosen not for excellence, but for their ability to navigate the lowest common denominator of European politics.