It is worth noting that Thucydides' own response to "The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must" was "acting this way will make your allies and enemies alike turn on you at the first opportunity, and raze your city to the ground".
Great stuff. I really enjoy the clarity and brevity of the points you've outlined. These points come across clearly, would be great if people in power would also listen...
This is a painful, yet important read. I still think that a winning AI strategy for Europe to accelerate AI adoption rather than double down on development, but I appreciate your admission of having second thoughts. I think constant re-evaluation is important.
great post veery suggestive. May be Europe can become more reasonable climatewise, but I doubt it. Too much green ideology is all pover the place, but one should never dispair.
This piece uses Greenland as a focal point, but its real subject is structural: what is the rational response when one actor systematically defects from cooperative equilibria.
The argument rests on three core points.
First, the Trump administration is not merely violating existing rules episodically; defection itself has become institutionalized. Under such conditions, continued unilateral cooperation is no longer a dominant strategy in game-theoretic terms.
Second, Europe’s actual leverage lies less in tariffs than in capital, platforms, and institutional market access—particularly vis-à-vis technology firms that depend heavily on European markets while being closely aligned with U.S. political power.
Third, without a credible outside option, negotiations are structurally asymmetric. From that perspective, maintaining strategic flexibility toward China is less about alignment of values and more about restoring bargaining power.
Importantly, this “pivot” toward China is framed not as trust, but as optionality. Its primary effect is not cooperation with Beijing per se, but a recalibration of U.S. expectations about Europe’s constraints.
Overall, the article usefully shifts the discussion away from moral reaction and toward structural incentives, asking which levers actually exist in the current system—and which do not. Whether one agrees with its conclusions or not, that analytical framing is valuable.
tbh I have struggled with this whole Greenland thing. Once again it turns out the the big scary monster in the room is just a bad dream. We have ended up in a place where the US will strongly reinforce arctic defence bases in Greenland. This surely improves the overall position of NATO and ties the US in a little deeper.
So yes, Trump's methods and words are way outside the accepted norm. But it seems everyone is so busy trying to prove how wrong he is that we are not offering any real alternative. The US is still our best ally and will still be in 3 years. Fixing our own house will make that alliance stronger, no matter the words coming out of the White House.
While I agree with the logic you have spelled out I don't agree with the framing or overall strategic approach. Is it really worth risking everything the west has worked for to save another legacy european colonial project? Was it truly so awful for the Bahamas to separate front the British crown? We're the dutch really providing better governance to Indonesia than what they ended up doing? Trump may be misguided but he does have a point. By what right does Denmark deserve to extend it's powers so far from it's shore on a different peoples. Is the current status quo really the best thing for Denmark or Europe for that matter? The whole project was build on the presumption that larger polities would not go around bullying smaller ones with cash and weapons. Let the natives (as few as they are) of Greenland settle their own matters in the best way that they see fit.
I think Puerto Rico would be a much better example. In this case it is clear that the locals prefer to be part of the united states'. My understanding from Greenland is that the locals are not so enamoured with danish rule.
In the case of Alaska and Hawaii the native born indigenous population is a small fraction of the total and neither state has any substantial succession movements.
I hope Europe doesn't start fining American tech companies just to get back at Trump. It reminds me of the bank robbers who were asked why they robbed banks, and said "That's where the money is."
Pieter, your subtitle alone is worth the read - the Thucydidean inversion captures the whole argument. I wrote a satirical piece last week from Dame Europa's perspective as she receives Sam's "freshly laminated Life Plan." Your post gives her the toolkit she only hints at: treasuries, DSA, anti-coercion instruments. Same diagnosis, different register - she signs off with "regulated affection," you give her the regulations: https://rajeshachanta.substack.com/p/conscious-uncoupling
The point about Europe financing American debt is one that should concentrate minds. Structural power sitting unused. The question is whether credible threat requires actual willingness to use it - and your honesty about the anti-coercion instrument's political constraints suggests probably not yet.
#1: Network effects are overhyped. Meta has some of the best engenieers of the world who also earn a little fortune. Why would Zuck pay them so much if the code doesn't matter much and most of Meta's value is its network effect? You could say they work in other stuff besides keeping and aumenting the user base, but that isn't overall true. Alas, we have seen many social networks such as Tik Tok being excepcionally successful (not due to networks, because there were any) and many other big players have gone extint.
#2: Even if the previous point wasn't true, if Europe cut ties with Meta, X and so... how would the European alternative deal with the lost users from the rest of the world? An European Twitter, without American users, would be extremely boring and my quality of life would be quite worse. So, no easy, costless alternative.
Agreed that network effects aren't everything, but network effects are enough to get you high engineer compensation. In a winner-take-all-market, the leverage of the engineers at the winning firm is immense. It is very important that WhatsApp doesn't suffer an outage. Twitter is a pretty good example of a product that has many users that are clearly eager to shift, but cannot.
That being said, I, too, would be sad if Twitter was lost. Both of us are Twitter power users, and it is a great platform that has given me lots of joy and opportunities. But it is also a firm led by someone closely connected to Trump, and visibly associated with the project. A temporary suspension certainly wouldn't be costless, but it would be a pretty strong signal.
Apart from 12-13 ("the likeliest outcome is failure"), I like your thinking, especially 10 and 14, and I would like 7 if I understood exactly what we would be fining and suspending the tech giants for.
So far, the track record of the EU, either collectively or separately, is pretty poor on technology moonshots. I think a good recent example is Gaia-X. I would like it to be different, but I'm not sure what grounds we have to think that would be the case. With the ACI from point 7, the grounds are the behavior of the government the firm is headquartered in.
In the Greenland case, could Trump’s apparent chaotic statements be interpreted as a signaling strategy designed to force other players into costly responses that reveal their true preferences? If so, how does this transform a situation of vague diplomacy into a separating equilibrium, and what are the potential risks and benefits of such a strategy in repeated negotiations with allies and adversaries?
It is worth noting that Thucydides' own response to "The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must" was "acting this way will make your allies and enemies alike turn on you at the first opportunity, and raze your city to the ground".
Which was pretty much what ended up happening.
Great stuff. I really enjoy the clarity and brevity of the points you've outlined. These points come across clearly, would be great if people in power would also listen...
This is a painful, yet important read. I still think that a winning AI strategy for Europe to accelerate AI adoption rather than double down on development, but I appreciate your admission of having second thoughts. I think constant re-evaluation is important.
great post veery suggestive. May be Europe can become more reasonable climatewise, but I doubt it. Too much green ideology is all pover the place, but one should never dispair.
This piece uses Greenland as a focal point, but its real subject is structural: what is the rational response when one actor systematically defects from cooperative equilibria.
The argument rests on three core points.
First, the Trump administration is not merely violating existing rules episodically; defection itself has become institutionalized. Under such conditions, continued unilateral cooperation is no longer a dominant strategy in game-theoretic terms.
Second, Europe’s actual leverage lies less in tariffs than in capital, platforms, and institutional market access—particularly vis-à-vis technology firms that depend heavily on European markets while being closely aligned with U.S. political power.
Third, without a credible outside option, negotiations are structurally asymmetric. From that perspective, maintaining strategic flexibility toward China is less about alignment of values and more about restoring bargaining power.
Importantly, this “pivot” toward China is framed not as trust, but as optionality. Its primary effect is not cooperation with Beijing per se, but a recalibration of U.S. expectations about Europe’s constraints.
Overall, the article usefully shifts the discussion away from moral reaction and toward structural incentives, asking which levers actually exist in the current system—and which do not. Whether one agrees with its conclusions or not, that analytical framing is valuable.
tbh I have struggled with this whole Greenland thing. Once again it turns out the the big scary monster in the room is just a bad dream. We have ended up in a place where the US will strongly reinforce arctic defence bases in Greenland. This surely improves the overall position of NATO and ties the US in a little deeper.
So yes, Trump's methods and words are way outside the accepted norm. But it seems everyone is so busy trying to prove how wrong he is that we are not offering any real alternative. The US is still our best ally and will still be in 3 years. Fixing our own house will make that alliance stronger, no matter the words coming out of the White House.
While I agree with the logic you have spelled out I don't agree with the framing or overall strategic approach. Is it really worth risking everything the west has worked for to save another legacy european colonial project? Was it truly so awful for the Bahamas to separate front the British crown? We're the dutch really providing better governance to Indonesia than what they ended up doing? Trump may be misguided but he does have a point. By what right does Denmark deserve to extend it's powers so far from it's shore on a different peoples. Is the current status quo really the best thing for Denmark or Europe for that matter? The whole project was build on the presumption that larger polities would not go around bullying smaller ones with cash and weapons. Let the natives (as few as they are) of Greenland settle their own matters in the best way that they see fit.
Presumably this means you think Hawaii and Alaska should leave the USA?
I think Puerto Rico would be a much better example. In this case it is clear that the locals prefer to be part of the united states'. My understanding from Greenland is that the locals are not so enamoured with danish rule.
In the case of Alaska and Hawaii the native born indigenous population is a small fraction of the total and neither state has any substantial succession movements.
I hope Europe doesn't start fining American tech companies just to get back at Trump. It reminds me of the bank robbers who were asked why they robbed banks, and said "That's where the money is."
One aspect that you don't mention about Carney and Sheinbaum: both are climate champions and, nevertheless, are adapting to the situation.
Carney is probably best known as a climate champion.
Sheinbaum, maybe less so. But she was a lead author of a chapter in the fifth assessment report of the IPCC.
Yes, this is very notable. I think this makes their pragmatism (and Europe's lack of it), all the more striking.
Pieter, your subtitle alone is worth the read - the Thucydidean inversion captures the whole argument. I wrote a satirical piece last week from Dame Europa's perspective as she receives Sam's "freshly laminated Life Plan." Your post gives her the toolkit she only hints at: treasuries, DSA, anti-coercion instruments. Same diagnosis, different register - she signs off with "regulated affection," you give her the regulations: https://rajeshachanta.substack.com/p/conscious-uncoupling
The point about Europe financing American debt is one that should concentrate minds. Structural power sitting unused. The question is whether credible threat requires actual willingness to use it - and your honesty about the anti-coercion instrument's political constraints suggests probably not yet.
Thanks!
Regarding point 6, I think it has two big flaws:
#1: Network effects are overhyped. Meta has some of the best engenieers of the world who also earn a little fortune. Why would Zuck pay them so much if the code doesn't matter much and most of Meta's value is its network effect? You could say they work in other stuff besides keeping and aumenting the user base, but that isn't overall true. Alas, we have seen many social networks such as Tik Tok being excepcionally successful (not due to networks, because there were any) and many other big players have gone extint.
#2: Even if the previous point wasn't true, if Europe cut ties with Meta, X and so... how would the European alternative deal with the lost users from the rest of the world? An European Twitter, without American users, would be extremely boring and my quality of life would be quite worse. So, no easy, costless alternative.
Agreed that network effects aren't everything, but network effects are enough to get you high engineer compensation. In a winner-take-all-market, the leverage of the engineers at the winning firm is immense. It is very important that WhatsApp doesn't suffer an outage. Twitter is a pretty good example of a product that has many users that are clearly eager to shift, but cannot.
That being said, I, too, would be sad if Twitter was lost. Both of us are Twitter power users, and it is a great platform that has given me lots of joy and opportunities. But it is also a firm led by someone closely connected to Trump, and visibly associated with the project. A temporary suspension certainly wouldn't be costless, but it would be a pretty strong signal.
Apart from 12-13 ("the likeliest outcome is failure"), I like your thinking, especially 10 and 14, and I would like 7 if I understood exactly what we would be fining and suspending the tech giants for.
So far, the track record of the EU, either collectively or separately, is pretty poor on technology moonshots. I think a good recent example is Gaia-X. I would like it to be different, but I'm not sure what grounds we have to think that would be the case. With the ACI from point 7, the grounds are the behavior of the government the firm is headquartered in.
In the Greenland case, could Trump’s apparent chaotic statements be interpreted as a signaling strategy designed to force other players into costly responses that reveal their true preferences? If so, how does this transform a situation of vague diplomacy into a separating equilibrium, and what are the potential risks and benefits of such a strategy in repeated negotiations with allies and adversaries?